Rules of Engagement (ROE)

• Introduction
• Rules of Engagement - general
• Government sources
• Analysis
• ADF Rules of Engagement
• Introduction
• Government sources
• Analysis

Introduction

Within the wider context of the laws of armed conflict, the political and legal mandate under which forces operate in a given conflict, and military bureaucratic-legal structures of authority and command, rules of engagement are rules for military force specifying the circumstances and manner and limits of the use of force. In the NATO and US military usage, rules of engagement are

"directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered."

With the increased frequency of a variety of forms of state armed conflict other than declared wars, and with the rise of a degree of global public scrutiny of the activities of military forces in armed interventions and peace-keeping operations, specification and scrutiny of whether or not the activities of armed forces conform to both wider structures of law and specific sets of rules of engagement has also increased. Most governments do not disclose the specific and detailed rules of engagement under which particular armed forces are operating on the grounds that opposing forces would then be able to take advantage of self-imposed constraints. Equally rules of engagement in given situations become a matter of controversy in the eyes of both critics of inappropriate use of violence and critics of "insufficiently robust" or restrictive rules of engagement.

Rules of engagement are especially important in the context of peace-keeping operations and humanitarian interventions. In the context of the privatization of security forces in even extreme conflict zones there is substantial concern about the lack of regulation of private security operators.

One other area of great concern have been the rules of engagement applying to interrogation of prisoners by US, Australian and other coalition forces, especially in the context of the refusal by governments of those countries to view prisoners as enemy combatants under the Geneva Conventions. This refusal has been accompanied by US official redefinitions of torture.

Rules of Engagement - general

Government sources

Basic Terminology and Concepts in International Peacekeeping Operations: An Analytical Review, Colonel Andrei Demurenko and Professor Alexander Nikitin, translated by Mr. Robert R. Love, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, 1997

“Rules of Engagement. One of the most important principles of international peacekeeping operations is restraint in the use of force (weapons). This principle is usually formulated as follows: weapons may be used only under extreme circumstances, when there is no other way to protect the life and health of service personnel. Much significance is attached to the creation, adoption and observance of the "rules of engagement" (abbreviated "ROE" in English-language sources). These rules strictly govern all instances involving the justifiable use of weapons, as well as the restrictions and rules for their use.

“The key elements covered in the rules of engagement are the following:

• rules for carrying and storing weapons;
• definition of the possibilities and rules for the justifiable use of weapons, including: self-defense of peacekeeping personnel, defense of peacekeeping posts and facilities, support of other peacekeeping subunits, [enforcing] compliance with the conditions of demilitarized and buffer zones, and prevention of violent flare-ups that threaten the life and health of the population.

“The rules of engagement state:

• the requirement for, and rules for, giving clear warning as to the possibility that weapons may be used;
• the requirement that actions be taken to forestall situations which could cause arms to be used;
• the display of decisive intent to use weapons if the actions requiring their use do not cease;
• accountability for an inappropriate use of weapons.”

Analysis

Rules of engagement, Wikipedia

Brief basic introduction

Rules of Engagement for Operation Provide Relief, Somalia, 1992
Source, Wikipedia, courtesy of the 75th Ranger Regiment, U.S. Army.

US Rules of Engagement for Iraq, Wikileaks (Wikileaks release date 4 February 2008)

Twenty-seven page 2005 document headed SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20151003. DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ. ANNEX E (CONSOLIDATED ROE) TO 3-187 FRAGO 02, OPORD 02-005. The most detailed US ROE document dealing with recent operations to be made public. Attached Wikileaks article contains summary, and links to analysis by a number of media analyses.

"This establishes the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for all forces under the control of Multi-National Division -- Baghdad. Coalition Forces (CF) may establish more restrictive ROE in accordance with their national caveats. Conflicting ROE will be addressed on a case-by-case basis."

Cross-border clashes from Iraq O.K., Eric Schmitt And Michael R. Gordon, New York Times, 4 February 2008.

Analysis of one aspect of the 2005 leaked US ROE.

Misfortunes of war : press and public reactions to civilian deaths in wartime, Eric V. Larson, Bogdan Savych, RAND Corporation, 2006.

"Adversaries understand the public’s sensitivities to civilian deaths and have sought to exploit civilian casualty incidents to erode the support of domestic publics; drive wedges in coalitions; and affect campaign strategy, targeting, and rules of engagement. The cases of Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999) in particular suggested how adversaries have sought to use human shields, provide press access to sites of alleged civilian deaths, and otherwise trumpet these incidents in the press to affect warfighting strategy, not without some success."

Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq, Appendix E: Rules of Engagement for U.S. Military Forces in Iraq, Human Rights Watch, 2003.

"Issued by U.S. Central Command Combined Forces Land Component Commander."

ADF Rules of Engagement

Introduction

The fullest concrete discussion of ADF rules of engagement was provided by the Defence Department during Operation Falconer in March-April 2003. As the precise ROE for that operation were not disclosed, and any differences with those of other ADF operations are not immediately clear. Notwithstanding this lack of detail, the Operation Falconer ROE statement established general characteristics of ADF ROE in that case that may be more widely applicable:

• claimed necessity for non-disclosure of ROE: “Precise knowledge by an adversary of the limitations that have been placed on the use of force by Australian forces could endanger the lives of ADF personnel.”

• compliance (“in broad terms”) with Australia’s domestic and international legal obligations.

• authorization of “necessary and proportionate lethal force all Iraqi military and paramilitary forces”

• prohibition on attack of “civilians or other persons protected by the Geneva Conventions, such as those who are incapacitated by sickness or wounding, and are unable to defend themselves, or who have surrendered”

• prohibition on use of landmines and cluster munitions

• more stringent than those of United States military.

Government sources

Operation Slipper ROE

Update: ADF Supports Dutch Against Taliban Attacks In Southern Afghanistan, Media release, Department of Defence, 24 June 2007.

"Further to yesterday’s announcement regarding ADF support to Dutch operations in Uruzgan and the statement overnight by Afghanistan President, Hamid Karzai, regarding his concern in relation to civilian causalities, Defence confirms that it aims to avoid and minimise civilian causalities and has done so in the case of recent actions in Uruzgan. Defence is concerned about any loss of innocent lives and Australian forces operate under Rules of Engagement that aim to avoid and minimise civilian casualties."

Operation Falconer ROE

Operation Falconer, Frequent Questions, Department of Defence

“Australian rules of engagement have been endorsed by Government and issued to commanders. They define the circumstances and limitations within which military force may be applied during operations in Iraq. Rules of engagement are by necessity protected. Precise knowledge by an adversary of the limitations that have been placed on the use of force by Australian forces could endanger the lives of ADF personnel. However, in broad terms, Australian rules of engagement comply fully with Australia’s domestic and international legal obligations, including Australia’s obligations under the Laws of Armed Conflict, the Geneva Conventions, and other treaties to which Australia is a Party.

"Under these obligations, Australian forces will be authorised to engage with necessary and proportionate lethal force all Iraqi military and paramilitary forces, as required to achieve their mission.

"Australian forces will not attack civilians or other persons protected by the Geneva Conventions, such as those who are incapacitated by sickness or wounding, and are unable to defend themselves, or who have surrendered.

"Australian forces will not attack civilians, other persons protected by the Geneva Conventions, or civilian objects such as civilian buildings, provided they are not being used for a military purpose. Under the same conditions, Australian forces will also not attack objects and infrastructure such as hospitals, places of worship, objects of cultural significance, dams, dykes and nuclear power stations.

"Additionally, and consistent with Australia’s obligations under the Ottawa Convention, Australian forces will not use or assist or encourage others to use anti-personnel landmines.

"As a matter of Government policy, the use of cluster munitions by Australian forces has been prohibited.

"Are Australia’s rules of engagement more stringent than those of the United States? Australia is party to more international treaties than the United States. Australia has more stringent obligations under international law. For example, as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention we prohibit the use of anti-personnel land mines. Also, as a matter of policy we prohibit the use of cluster bomb munitions. These differences will not affect our ability to work with United States forces.”

Operation Bastille ROE

Operation Bastille, Frequently Asked Questions, Department of Defence

Analysis

Strategic Insight 23 - Precarious State: Afghanistan and the international and Australian response, Elsina Wainwright, ASPI, 28 March 2006.

“There is a question as to whether NATO’s rules of engagement will be suffcient: while these will be more robust for the south than in the north and west, NATO’s posture remains an essentially peacekeeping and stabilising one. The Dutch-Australian PRT will therefore need a significant security emphasis, and more robust mandates, rules of engagement and equipment will be required than in the north and west. Australian troops have not in the past been closely interoperable with Dutch forces, and will likely be working more closely with them than with the Japanese in Al Muthanna in Iraq. In addition, Australian personnel will receive protection from the Dutch, and their security will depend on the Dutch rules of engagement. It will be essential for the Netherlands to have very robust rules of engagement to meet Australian needs; this will require tough decisions of the Dutch Government.”

"Jim Wallace on Afghan troop deployment”, PM, ABC Radio National, July 13, 2005.

"MARK COLVIN: Retired Brigadier Jim Wallace is a former commander of Australia's SAS and special forces.
MARK COLVIN: There are also issues of rules of engagement. I have heard rumblings that suggest that on occasions Australians have not been too happy with the way that the Americans have enforced the rules of engagement.
JIM WALLACE: Well that's right. That’ll happen in any multilateral force I think, because the rules of engagement in the end go back to the political intent and the political will of the government that's sending them and, obviously, people coming from a multinational force, or in a multinational force, are coming from a different government perspective, different national perspective. So, there won't always be 100 per cent agreement over rules of engagement but you can be sure that the Australian rules of engagement will be approved back here, to Australia, to the Defence headquarters and ultimately I think you'll find, the National Security Committee of Cabinet."
MARK COLVIN: But if Australians are under US command is there ever any problem there?
JIM WALLACE: No. This issue of rules of engagement is one of those things that the national commander will reserve the right to decide whether or not his forces do something on the basis of the agreed rules of engagement by which the Australian or national commitment has been made.

“Wounded Iraqi demands compensation”, Brendan Nicholson, The Age, March 18, 2005.

"An Iraqi civilian shot by Australian soldiers in Baghdad is seeking compensation from the Australian Defence Force - a move that could trigger a landmark court battle over the rights and obligations of troops posted overseas. 'The interesting thing here would be civil liability as opposed to our guys using rules of engagement to do their job and who then becomes liable,' a Defence Department source said.

"In January soldiers near the Australian embassy in Baghdad shot a man who ignored instructions to move on. The man was wounded and Iraqi authorities took him away. Reports said he died.
A journalist who investigated said witnesses told him the man was involved in a minor traffic accident. He got out to inspect the damage, ignored the soldiers' shouts and was shot. In each case the Defence Force investigated and concluded that the soldiers had complied with the rules of engagement."

“Our pilots refused to bomb 40 times”, Frank Walker, Sydney Morning Herald, March 14, 2004.

"Australia's F/A-18 pilots defied the orders of American commanders and refused to drop their bombs on up to 40 missions during the invasion of Iraq, it can now be revealed. In a remarkable account of how our airmen applied Australian rules of engagement, an RAAF pilot has told The Sun-Herald each of the 14 RAAF Hornet pilots aborted three to four bombing runs because intelligence given at pre-flight briefings did not concur with what they found at the target.

"Squadron Leader Daryl Pudney last week described how he and other Australian F/A-18 pilots were forced to weigh up the risk of civilian casualties in a split second before dropping their bombs.He said pilots broke off many missions after they saw the target and decided there was not a valid military reason to drop their bombs.

"But it appears there were fundamental differences between the US dominated headquarters and Australian pilots over what constituted a valid military target. Squadron Leader Pudney said under Australia's rules of engagement pilots had to ask themselves on each mission whether it was right to drop their bombs.

"'Each guy would have made that decision once to half a dozen times in the conflict. It was presented as being just one pilot in one incident, but it was all of us several times,' he said. 'We were providing an identification of targets in conjunction with ground forces, and if we were not 100 per cent sure we were taking out a valid military target in accordance with our specifications we just did not drop.'

"Squadron Leader Pudney said he could not comment on the reasons they aborted specific missions. But it seems that it was often to avoid the unnecessary killing of civilians. 'As we approached the target area we confirmed we had the right place. Then we'd run a check provided through our training that we were doing the right thing by our rules of engagement. We exercise those all the time. In Iraq it was a matter of the briefings we received prior in regards to our rules of engagement, as to whether we thought this was a target we should be destroying. If it was not, then we decided not to deploy.' He said most decisions were made in the air, but some were command decisions."

Australian pilots aborted US-assigned bombing raids during Iraq war, Terry Cook, WSWS, 23 March 2004

"Given the enormous pressure exerted on military personnel in a war zone and the extreme penalties that flow from disobeying orders, the Hornet pilots’ decision to abort missions suggests there were widespread misgivings among sections of the armed forces about the legality of the US-led invasion and therefore of any actions they might be called upon to carry out.

"According to the Australian Defence Department, the rules of engagement forbade strikes on hospitals, schools, places of worship, dams and nuclear power stations and, unlike those governing the US, banned the use of cluster bombs and land mines. Pressed during a media interview in March last year about what would be required of Australian troops under US command, Hill replied that the US, 'knows the restrictions that Australia has accepted under various international conventions and the like, and they simply don’t put us in an awkward position.' The latest revelations reveal that assurance to be a lie.

"Anticipating high civilian casualties, Hill attempted a justification in advance. Any Iraqi military installations or weapons near civilian populations were a 'grey area.' He would only guarantee that 'civilian targets with only some incidental military benefit' would be avoided.

"Hill’s claim that Australia abided by international agreements banning the use of cluster bombs and other anti-personnel devices is just more cynical deception. While there have been no reports that Australian planes used such weapons, they most certainly would have provided cover for US aircraft that dropped cluster munitions and for US tanks and artillery that fired anti-personnel shells during the invasion. One such attack by US forces using cluster munitions left 61 civilians dead and 450 seriously wounded, including many children, in Hilla, a town 80 kilometres from Baghdad.

“Legal landmines confronting troops”, Cosima Marriner, Sydney Morning Herald, March 22 2003

"In balancing military objectives against civilian safety, Australian forces will be governed by rules of engagement. As Colonel Rowan Tink, commander of the Australian SAS forces in Afghanistan, said bluntly: '[In] a war zone, you just can't shoot anybody. You have to meet a number of criteria before you can engage the target.'

"The basic laws of war are the same for everyone. The most hard and fast is that civilians and civilian infrastructure - including schools, churches and hospitals - must not be attacked. But what if Australian soldiers have evidence that Saddam has stashed weapons in a school with innocent civilians? That's when 'the rule of proportionality' comes into play. The commander must be convinced the 'concrete and direct military advantage anticipated' outweighs the possible 'civilian loss of life, destruction of civilian objects or destruction of things necessary for civilian life'.

"The US has not ratified additional protocols to the Geneva Convention, nor signed the Ottowa Convention on anti-personnel landmines. While the Defence Force says the exact rules for Operation Falconer are 'highly classified', it is known that Australian troops are banned from using anti-personnel landmines and cluster bombs, while US forces are not. So, although the US will direct Australian military action in Iraq, Australian soldiers will be bound by additional rules, summarised on a card handed to each soldier before the campaign.

"The Defence Minister insists Australian rules of engagement will not be compromised in Iraq. 'The United States ... know the restrictions that Australia has accepted under various international conventions and the like and they simply don't put us in an awkward position,' Senator Hill told ABC Radio this week. But he would not categorically rule out Australian support for coalition operations that used landmines or cluster bombs."

“Australia will fight by its own rules, Hill vows”, Cosima Marriner, Sydney Morning Herald, March 20 2003.

3 March 2008